Abstract: This article responds to three concerns regarding the viability of Nietzsche's conception of value creation. Section I examines the claim that philosophy is unlikely to contribute to the creation of value. Section II argues that some puzzles regarding Nietzsche's allegedly highest value of life-affi rmation may require for a solution two diff erent conceptions of life-affi rmation: basic life-affi rmation b and Life-affi rmation e par excellence, which is both qualitatively diff erent and based on a theoretically more demanding conception of life. Section three proposes that Nietzsche's perspectivist method, which distinguishes between perspectival "knowing" and perspectival "objective" knowledge in GM III 12, may usefully be applied to the knowledge and recognition of diff erences in value perspectives and help improve our value practices.
In his article Nietzsche's Highest Value (Affi rmation of Life) and its Limits 1.6 [James Porter] points out an important ambiguity in Nietzsche's value of life-affi rmation. In Section 2 I will argue that some of the problems regarding the standing of Nietzsche's allegedly highest value (affi rmation of life) may be resolved if we attribute to Nietzsche two diff erent conceptions of life-affi rmation, one basic and one theoretically more demanding.
Finally, prompted by 1.7 [Vanessa Lemm]'s analysis of Nietzsche's plant metaphors and 1.9 [Maudemarie Clark]'s On Creating Values, I will briefl y return to what I previously called the 'hard problem of value' concerning the coexistence of realist and non-realist conceptions of value. I suggest that there may be further epistemic resources for improving our value practices to be found in Nietzsche's perspectivist proposal of knowledge (Erkenntnis), which he distinguishes in GM III 12 from mere perspectival "knowing" (perspektivisches "Erkennen").
Philosophers as creators of values?
1.1 [Henning Ottmann] cautions that today answers to questions of the 'which values … ?'-kind, what I take as will become clear to be questions regarding fi rst-order values, are unlikely to come from philosophers (p. 5). Such guidance is more likely to come from religion(s) and 'lived life' (gelebtes Leben) rather than philosophical refl ection. In order to determine which role, if any, philosophers (in Nietzsche's non-pejorative understanding of the term¹) may play, it may be necessary to distinguish between a fi rst-order and a second-order concept of value. When Nietzsche asks the question regarding the (second-order) value of previous, current, and future (fi rst-order) values, e.g. in GM III 17, he does not actually propose not new fi rst-order values but instead describes something close to a method of enquiry. He fi rst identifi es a set of (fi rstorder) values (this I think aligns with 1.9 [Maudemarie Clark]'s 'descriptive values') and then comes up with an explanatory hypothesis in which ways certain values contribute to a specifi c, overall highest good for a specifi c life (e.g. Nachlass 1884, 26[55], KSA 11.162). The (second-order) value of these values he identifi es with 'a positive feeling', or pro-attitude, engendered by the set of (fi rst-order) values. Highest goods are always relational and both type-and token-dependent, i.e. x is a good always only for a particular token z of a type y, they nevertheless follow, and here Nietzsche himself generalizes heuristically, what he calls a logic of feeling (Logik des Gefühls) (GM 1 Nietzsche very often uses the term philosopher pejoratively. 1.1 [Henning Ottmann] rightly worries about (our) disciplinary overconfidence and may well be correct, in the spirit of 1.2 [Martin Saar] that new (first-order) values are unlikely to be created by today's philosophers. But I think we should be cautious not to misapply Nietzsche's idea and ideal of the 'value-creating philosopher' -a type of thinker who he saw at considerable distance to the lectern (cf. SE 8).
III 17). For example, values that contribute to an increase of Leidlosigkeit (absence of suff ering) engender a pro-attitude in the one who suff ers. The token individual of a psychological type thus evaluates -"feels" -the absence of any kind of suff ering or resistance as positive ("als d a s Positive selbst empfunden"). While certain values may, for example, increase feelings of self-effi cacy and autonomy for some psychological types, such values are not universalizable.² GM III 17 thus opens with an invective against those who prescribe universalization. It calls for "practitioners" of values who no longer prescribe universal remedies to alleviate merely the symptoms of a sickness (the same, "ascetic" remedy for all types and tokens) but who instead are able to fi rst identify and then perhaps target what Nietzsche sees as the underlying causes of the ailment.
The "medical history" Nietzsche constructs in GM hypothesizes that the real causes behind the symptoms, to which the set of ascetic values are merely one (problematic) treatment, have to do with an initial violation and distortion, due to socialization and internalization of drives, of basic psychological needs. According to the explanatory hypothesis that Nietzsche attempted to work out in his later writings, the basic psychological needs of the human animal are a genuine (as opposed to ascetic) sense of self-effi cacy, a genuine feeling of autonomy, as well as living, agonistic relationships with itself and others. Thus, rather than proposing new, structurally similar, fi rst-order values that replace ascetic values,³ Nietzsche issues a call to carry out research into the human animals' psychological needs. In the famous remark at the end of GM's fi rst essay he proposes an interdisciplinary, both philosophical and empirical research programme for the study of values as expressions of physiological and psychological needs with the goal to better understand human fl ourishing and well-being.
Empirical psychology has to date done a great deal of comparative work and presently assumes that "the basic psychological needs are competence, autonomy, and relatedness," which it considers, across diff erent cultural expressions, as "necessary and suffi cient to promote human growth and functioning."⁴ In this body of re- search, competence is (currently) defi ned roughly as genuine sense of profi ciency and concomitant feeling of eff ectiveness. Autonomy is (currently) defi ned as engagement in activities that express who one is and what one values. And, fi nally, relatedness is (currently) defi ned as feelings of relatedness and interdependence with others or a group. Empirical psychology is, thus far, corroborating Nietzsche's hypotheses about some set, or sets, of basic needs the understanding of which may contribute to our improved understanding of diff erent moralities and value systems more generally. A lot of the work that has been carried out by the empirical sciences and in particular empirical psychology falls squarely within the remit of Nietzsche's interdisciplinary research project of human values and human fl ourishing.⁵ Thus, while today's (academic) philosophers are certainly no legislators of new fi rst-order values, Nietzsche certainly had a vision for what kind of broad, conceptual and empirical, research he thought was required in order to fi nd better answers to questions such as 'Which values should we teach our children?'. System of values, this is the guiding hypothesis, could be evaluated better if the requisites for lifeaffi rmation, i.e. physiological and psychological fl ourishing for individuals of diff erent types, were better understood. While Nietzsche comes up with a wealth of observations from which he infers some basic underlying needs, he was well aware that rather than presenting answers he was formulating a research programme that would have to involve many diff erent sciences.⁶ And yet, does it make sense for Nietzsche to argue that a set of values may be good (and goods or ends) for a particular form of life, and yet fall short of life-affi rmation par excellence as he seems to claim? It is this set of question that brings me to the second, closely related issue I wish to address: is there a major ambiguity in Nietzsche's value of life-affi rmation that robs it of its explanatory signifi cance? It is precisely Nietzsche's allegedly highest value, life-affi rmation, that 1.6 [James Porter] challenges.
Is it possible to affirm life improperly?
In nuce, 1.6's argument goes something like this: (1) Life-affi rmation is a quality that is, for Nietzsche, an irrefrangible good.⁷ (2) Any basic act of will, if successful, is an 5 As is well known, Nietzsche often refers to himself as the first psychologist philosopher: "Wer war überhaupt vor mir unter den Philosophen P s y c h o l o g und nicht vielmehr dessen Gegensatz "hö-herer Schwindler", "Idealist"? Es gab vor mir noch gar keine Psychologie." (EH Destiny 6) 6 Nietzsche frequently criticizes virtues as means to different ends, e.g. for increasing power, for different possessors (cf. Nachlass 1888, 14 [199] , KSA 13.382 f.). His concept of value thus allows taking up unfamiliar perspectives on first-order goods such as virtues. 7 1.6 [James Porter], p. 75: "essential and ineliminable property of life". instance of life-affi rmation.⁸ It follows that (3) any act of will is life-affi rming, a good, and therefore valuable.⁹ From this it is possible to arrive at some disconcerting inferences that threaten the coherence of Nietzsche's highest value such as "affi rmation is something about which we can never, so to speak, go wrong whenever we feel it" (1.6, p. 11). Or the nihilist, when he denies life (through acts of will), actually affi rms life. Ultimately, 1.6 [James Porter] concludes, that "the denial of life is self-refuting." (p. 76) If any willing is value creation qua basic life-affi rmation, then any psycho-physiological type, regardless of her drives and aff ective orientations constantly instantiates and creates, in each and every act of will, Nietzsche's highest value. If this was the case, on what basis could we make sense of Nietzsche's evaluations of specifi c types as, e.g. lower or higher, active or reactive?
1.6 [James Porter]'s argument is compelling and all I wish to do here is to off er some possible avenues for responses. As already hinted at in 1.3, it might be necessary to introduce, in addition to the concept of "pure" or basic life-affi rmation (life-affi rmation b ), a second concept, let's call it Life-affi rmation par excellence (Life-affi rmation e ). If Life-affi rmation e were, for example, based on a diff erent conception of Life, then the above diffi culty may disappear. If we assume that Nietzsche operates with a normative conception of Life (that promotes, according to his, i.e. our current best interdisciplinary research, human growth and functioning to a higher degree) that provides him, for example, with some criteria such as 'agonistic complexity' that 'aims at increasing both diversity and strength', then life-affi rmation b , though clearly a necessary condition, would fall short and could be diff erentiated from Life-affi rmation Lebens ist die Voraussetzung jedes S c h ä t z e n s ." But in addition to determinate -or perspectival -life-affi rmation, he frequently refers to other, higher, or even highest kinds of affi rmation that he discusses, for example, in EH, GT 2, and in EH, Z 1, with reference to the thought experiment of eternal recurrence.
When Nietzsche uses in GM I 11 the adjective 'tame' (zahm) to describe the reactive subject that he criticizes despite satisfying the criterion of life-affi rmation b , it becomes clear that Life-affi rmation e diff ers not only with regard to a more complex 8 1.6 [James Porter], p. 69: basic affirmation is defined as the "pleasurable exercise of an essential capacity". "Willing confers value just by the very fact of willing". And "affirmation is self-certifying and self-reinforcing". 9 1.6 [James Porter], p. 69: "any act of will is as "valuable" as any other. This is affirmation at its purest." 10 See my paper 1.3, p. 37 and footnote 22.
conception of Life, it seems to diff er also in quality, in its 'what-it-is-likeness': it is no longer simply a Lust-Gefühl, a feeling of pleasure due to an increase of self-effi cacy, the feeling of freedom or power.¹¹ Life-affi rmation e may contain also the qualitative feel of pain of which the tame or "decadent" man of GM I 11 knows little: "Es wird ein höchs ter Zustand von Bejahung des Daseins concipirt, aus dem auch der höchste Schmerz nicht abgerechnet werden kann" (Nachlass 1888, 17[3]3, KSA 13.522) And, fi nally, for the person who can respond affi rmatively to the thought experiment of eternal recurrence, affi rmation of Life par excellence requires, in the formulation of GS 341, facing up to the heaviest burden in every single choice of action ("die Frage bei Allem und Jedem "willst du diess noch einmal und noch unzählige Male?" würde als das grösste Schwergewicht auf deinem Handeln liegen!").¹² So it seems that just as on, for example, a Frankfurtian account of willing fi rst-order desires are a necessary condition, but insuffi cient for what we may call willing proper,¹³ basic acts of will, while necessary, fall short of Life-affi rmation e . As I have tried to show, the latter may be regarded as premised on a more complex, theoretical conception of Life and fl ourishing, and it may be said to also diff er qualitatively from basic affi rmation.
While this may help to address some of our worries, the normative standing of Nietzsche's conception of affi rmation remains elusive. However, Nietzsche is an optimist here. He predicts that the above-mentioned interdisciplinary research programme into the value of specifi c values for specifi c individuals or types may provide evidence that contributes to our understanding of diff erent kinds of fl ourishing, and to what sort of values may be better or worse in light of these. Any resulting conception of fl ourishing or Life-affi rmation e would always be (a) informed by the results of the philosophical and empirical interdisciplinary research programme, and (b) if we follow our best scientifi c practices, remains always open to revision. 12 See also Nachlass 1888, 20[133], KSA 13.571: "dieses höchste Hinderniß, / diesen Gedanken der Gedanken, / wer schuf ihn sich! / Das Leben selber schuf sich / sein höchstes Hinderniß: / über seinen Gedanken selber springt es nunmehr hinweg". On a reading of eternal recurrence as a thought experiment designed to maximize resistance to, and inhibit, decision-making that favours hedonistic, short-term goals over more demanding and more complex long-term goals, see Manuel Dries, Decision-Making under Maximal Resistance, in: Daniel Came (ed.), Nietzsche on Morality and the Affi rmation of Life, Oxford (forthcoming). 13 For example, in Frankfurt's account of willing, that I do not intend to endorse here, first-order desires are an enabling condition for action. However, action based on basic or first-order desires is a mark of the 'wanton' who lacks the ability to have second-order desires and make second-or higher-order desires her volitions.
Recognizing values -perspectival 'knowing' vs knowledge of values
I would like to end with a brief comment on the limits of the normative conclusions we may derive from Nietzsche's naturalizing analogy between the "creative" life of plants and the creative value practices of human beings.¹⁴ Nietzsche's frequent attempts to "retranslate man back into nature" form part of his research programme, discussed above, to study human beings and human cultural phenomena (among them moralities) both philosophically and empirically. And as I (among many) have argued elsewhere, this research programme is strongly motivated by the problem of value nihilism: when the hitherto "highest values devalue themselves", essential motivational requirements for life-affi rmative e willing and acting are no longer fulfi lled and fl ourishing is under threat. Nietzsche's philosophical attempts to overcome nihilism include a naturalizing strategy with the goal to reclaim values, and possibly their creation, from a supernatural realm. His own metaphysical assumptions (developed largely in the notebooks) reject both the metaphysical staticism and the separatism that he sees (correctly) as deeply entrenched.¹⁵ Many of his observations and arguments presuppose an adualistic, continuum model that admits drawing a number of functional analogies between inorganic, organic, animal, human, and cultural 'interpretive' processes. The strategy's goal is for both agents and values to lose their supernatural, mysterious properties. 'Knowing', Nietzsche can now claim, cannot and should no longer be seen as separate and separable from drives and aff ective orientations. Seeing and 'knowing' (Nietzsche's inverted commas) are never value-neutral and are always from an agential perspective. But, pace 1.7 [Vanessa Lemm], Nietzsche is not only critical of a previous supernaturalizing value creation, in many of his later remarks he shows that he is equally critical of any reductive naturalizations, what we may call the 'plant-logic' of value creation. In fact, he criticizes most value systems precisely as based on a falsifying qua reductive perspective (Optik), which tries to conserve this specifi c value system behind the protective shield of a metaphysical apparatus that reinforces their alleged objective authority. In AC 9 he contends:
Man macht bei sich eine Moral, eine Tugend, eine Heiligkeit aus dieser fehlerhaften Optik zu allen Dingen, man knüpft das g u t e Gewissen an das F a l s c h -sehen, -man fordert, dass keine a n d r e Art Optik mehr Werth haben dürfe, nachdem man die eigne mit den Namen "Gott" "Erlö-sung" "Ewigkeit" sakrosankt gemacht hat. However, if we look carefully, GM III 12 argues not simply (a) for perspectival "knowing" ("Erkennen") (Nietzsche's quotation marks), and (b) a new kind of "objectivity" (again these are Nietzsche's) that demands a comprehensive multiplying of aff ective perspectives. GM III 12 actually argues for knowledge, (Erkenntnis, Nietzsche uses without inverted commas), that is available only to a knower (Erkennender, again without inverted commas), capable to entertain and enter into many diff erent aff ective perspectives of something that is of value. Such a knower par excellence would not only be capable (1) to see one and the same thing through "many eyes." She would also (2) compare and register the diff erence in value for diff erent aff ective ways of "knowing" (that are usually blind to their own horizons). And, only then, (3) know the "objective" value -diff erent values -of something. Such knowing par excellence presupposes aff ective-refl ective capacities that would de-bias against taking any single perspective for more than it is, one particular perspective. Perspectival "knowing", then, is constitutive of but not suffi cient for the much more comprehensive, multi-perspectival knowledge required for the philosophical and empirical research programme Nietzsche had in mind.
Might there aft er all be some resources for the hard problem of value in Nietzsche's philosophy?
The hard problem of value creation 2
As I have argued previously, Nietzsche's non-realist conception conceives of values no longer as the kinds of things that simply are what they are once and for all, and that retain their motivating force. They require to be reinvented and reaffi rmed. We can now add that on a Nietzschean conception, recognizing values requires a better knowing that, as we saw, he hinted at in GM III 12. Nietzschean 'better knowing',¹⁶ if it exists, would be able to comprehend "objectively" due to an ability to enter into, and inhabit, and compare many diff erent aff ective perspectives. It would thereby know the diff erent values (plural) of one and the same thing, for and from diff erent perspectives. 'Better knowing' would be sensitive to the relation-dependence, complexity, and multiple realizability of any value that is only seemingly 'given'.¹⁷ How would a better knower in the above sense understand, for example, 'the' value of free speech? Is someone who publishes and re-publishes in the name of 16 Nietzschean 'better knowing', if it exists, would be very different from Schopenhauer's conception of 'better knowledge', i.e. knowledge of ideas, e.g. in aesthetic experience. 17 I am very sympathetic to 1.9 [Maudemarie Clark]'s distinction between descriptive and normative values. The normative properties of values n would not be, for reasons given above, agent neutral. As I argue above and in 1.3, it seems that for Nietzsche they would always be importantly agent-relational, but this would not make them, as Railton shows, relativistic. free speech off ensive cartoons in thrall of a reductive optics that takes free speech for something simpler than it is?¹⁸ Just as those who subsequently react with rage? Does a perspective that accepts something as sacred deserve to be recognized as such and coexist with our secular opposite value optics? A better knower, if she exists, if she was able to enter into, and step out of, and keep in mind, the various diff erent, secular and sacred, aff ective perspectives, may recognize that there is a hard problem of value. She may recognize also that value creation across the realist-antirealist divide demands a kind of tolerance that Nietzsche thought extremely rare, and hard to achieve for the kinds of things we are.¹⁹
